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ABSTRACT
This Article aims to fill a gap in the literature through a
conceptual analysis of Boko Haram’s global nature and utilizing that
analysis to evaluate current counter-terrorism measures against the
group. Central to this analysis will be the question of whether the
group can be categorized as a global jihadist group. Global jihadism
is understood in this Article as a pan-Islamist movement against
Western interests. This Article argues that status as a global jihadist
organization and hierarchy within the world’s global jihadist
movement are best evaluated on a three-criteria approach using the
indicators of conforming ideology, militant operations/targets, and
external relations or cooperation. It will be further argued that these
criteria are important not only to provide a more comprehensive
way of thinking of international terrorism but also in creating
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effective countermeasures to the Boko Haram threat. Using this
methodology, this Article argues that because of Boko Haram’s less
violent origins, its tepid connection to larger global jihadist
entrepreneurial groups, and its situational leader-centric
operational priorities, Boko Haram presents fertile potential to
arrive at relatively non-violent solutions to the conflict in Northern
Nigeria. Moreover, Nigeria’s counter-terrorism approach, which is
primarily military-based, and marred by corruption and massive
human rights abuses, is unlikely to succeed due to a lack of proper
conceptualization of Boko Haram’s evolution and its current status.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/4

2020]

Boko Haram in the Context of Global Jihadism

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.
VI.

Introduction ...................................................................... 158
Global Jihadism: A Conceptual Framework ............... 162
Boko Haram in the Context of Global Jihadism .......... 167
a. Ideology and Goals .......................................................... 167
b. Operations and Targets ................................................... 172
c. External Links ................................................................. 179
Countering the Boko Haram Threat .............................. 186
a. Military Approach........................................................... 187
b. Law Enforcement............................................................. 191
c. “Operation Safe Corridor”: De-Radicalization of Former
Militants ..................................................................... 193
d. Vigilantism ..................................................................... 195
Prospects for Nigeria’s Counterterrorism .................... 197
a. Peace Negotiations .......................................................... 197
b. Adopting a Causal Approach .......................................... 202
Conclusion ......................................................................... 203

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

157

158

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

I.

[Vol. 42:1

INTRODUCTION

Originally founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram
set out to impose strict Islamic law in Nigeria.1 Famously known for
its abduction of 276 school girls in 2014 from Chibok,2 and later 110
schoolgirls from Dapchi in 2018,3 the group has been designated as
a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department.4 Consistent
with its mandate, the group has operated primarily in Nigeria. 5

1
Yvonne Ndege, The Rise of Nigeria’s Boko Haram, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2013),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/09/201397155225146644.html
[http://perma.cc/C2CV-Q65D]; see also ALEX THURSTON, ‘THE DISEASE IS UNBELIEF’:
BOKO HARAM’S RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL WORLDVIEW 9-10 (The Brookings Project on
U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper No. 22, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Brookings-Analysis
-Paper_Alex-Thurston_Final_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/26N6-ZEBP] (tracing the
ideological roots and agendas of Boko Haram from 2002 to present).
2
Nina Strochlic, Six Years Ago, Boko Haram Kidnapped 276 schoolgirls. Where Are
They
Now?,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(Mar.
2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2020/03/six-years-ago-bokoharam-kidnapped-276-schoolgirls-where-are-they-now/
[https://perma.cc/G8ME-B32Y]; Aminu Abubakar, As Many as 200 Girls Abducted
by Boko Haram, Nigerian Officials Say, CNN (Apr. 16, 2014),
https://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/15/world/africa/nigeria-girls-abducted/inde
x.html [https://perma.cc/4ST6-N5BF].
3
Felix Onuah, Nigeria Says 110 Girls Unaccounted for After Boko Haram Attack,
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2018, 11:41 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeriasecurity/nigeria-says-110-girls-unaccounted-for-after-boko-haram-attack-idUSKC
N1G90Q3 [https://perma.cc/7F6C-X9R2]; see also Usman A. Tar & Samuel B.
Ayegba, The Ecology of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Environmental Security in
Northeastern Nigeria, in NEW ARCHITECTURE OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN AFRICA:
PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN THE LAKE CHAD
BASIN 241, 251 (Usman A. Tar & Bashir Bala eds., Lexington Books 2020) (discussing
Boko Haram’s kidnappings in Chibok and Dapchi).
4
Glenn Kessler, Boko Haram: Inside the State Department Debate over the
‘Terrorist’
Label,
WASH.
POST
(May
19,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2014/05/19/boko-h
aram-inside-the-state-department-debate-over-the-terrorist-label/
[https://perma.cc/Z6K6-TZT7].
5
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM
2013,
at
9
(2014),
https://2009-
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However, despite its nationalist agenda, Boko Haram has
maintained ties with internationalist jihadist groups, and in 2015
pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.6
Understanding the implications of Boko Haram’s ties to
organizations and actors outside of Nigeria offers a better
understanding of the group and its role in the international jihadist
movement, and as a result, this understanding is crucial to
anticipating Boko Haram’s actions.
Scholars have attempted to understand the Boko Haram
insurgency in Northern Nigeria through its membership, tactics,
targets, and agenda. In these studies, it is evident that Boko Haram
began as a locally-oriented Islamic group with less violent
tendencies, but rose to prominence through its imitation of the
Taliban, leading to the nickname, the Nigerian Taliban. 7 They
would later launch attacks against police and government
installations, 8 and transform into one of the most lethal terrorist
groups, with the capability to launch large-scale attacks and
kidnappings.9 Whereas the group existed to promote an Islamist
agenda and resentment of Western civilization, as its name
suggests, 10 its current form is not clearly defined. This research
focuses on the group’s transformation over time, with evidence of
more sophisticated tactics and transnational spread. In the same

2017.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YJ8YFEEZ] (stating that while the “group focuses principally on local Nigerian issues
and actors,” it has reportedly carried out some terrorist activities in Chad, Niger,
and Cameroon).
6
Adam Chandler, The Islamic State of Boko Haram? The Terrorist Group Has
Pledged Its Allegiance to ISIS. But What Does That Really Mean?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9,
2015),
https://theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/boko-harampledges-allegiance-islamic-state/387235/ [https://perma.cc/6WF4-NRQZ].
7
Freedom C. Onuoha, The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background Analysis and
Emerging Trend, 25 SEC. J. 134, 134-35, 138 (2012).
8
See ANDREW WALKER, U.S. INST. OF PEACE: SPECIAL REPORT: WHAT IS BOKO
HARAM? 3-6 (2012).
9 See id. at 4-6.
10
Who, What, Why: Exactly What Does The Phrase Boko Haram Mean?, BBC NEWS
(May 13, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-27390954
[https://perma.cc/4DQG-WG2P].

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

160

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:1

vein, the analysis will be useful in scrutinizing Nigeria’s counterterrorism efforts and critiquing the compatibility of these efforts
with the kind of threat posed by Boko Haram.
Despite considerable scholarship on the activities of Boko
Haram, there is a paucity of research investigating the group’s
relationship with global Islamic terrorist groups, notably Al-Qaeda
and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Islamic State of Syria and
Levant (ISIS/ISIL), and what these ties mean for the group’s status
in global jihadism. Existing literature has focused on understanding
the group’s transformation over the years in the manner in which it
has carried out attacks and its targets to find a correlation between
the group’s activities and other global jihadi movements,
specifically Al-Qaeda and ISIS. 11 Other accounts have tried to
decipher the origins of the group by linking it with domestic
political developments in Nigeria, especially in the northern region
where the group originated. 12 These studies provide very useful
perspectives on its growth and various dynamics of understanding
the evolution of this group. Existing research, however, lacks
methodological scrutiny in evaluating the global nature of Boko
Haram. By relying on mere characteristics without a well-defined
conceptual framework, the existing assumptions of Boko Haram’s

11
See, e.g., Jacob Zenn, Demystifying Al-Qaida in Nigeria: Cases from Boko
Haram’s Founding, Launch of Jihad and Suicide Bombings, 11 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 173
(2017) (finding early and continued relationship between Al-Qaeda and Boko
Haram); DAVID COOK, JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y OF RICE UNIV., BOKO
HARAM:
A
PROGNOSIS
(Dec.
16,
2011),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/535dcd14/REL-pub-Coo
kBokoHaram-121611.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL28-ED8T] (identifying Boko Haram
as one of the jihadi groups based on an analysis of their activities); Suranjan
Weeraratne, Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, 29
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 610 (2017) (identifying Boko Haram’s ties to Al Qaeda);
Caroline Varin & Dauda Abubakar, From Sectarianism to Terrorism in Northern
Nigeria: A Closer Look at Boko Haram, in VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN AFRICA
(Caroline Varin & Dauda Abubakar eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2017) (drawing
comparisons between Boko Haram’s and ISIS’s militant Islamic reform goals).
12
See Adam Higazi, Brandon Kendhammer, Kyari Mohammed, MarcAntoine Pérouse de Montclos & Alex Thurston, A Response to Jacob Zenn on Boko
Haram and Al-Qa’ida, 12 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 203, 205-06 (2018) (noting the
importance of local political factors in understanding the insurgence of Boko
Haram).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/4

2020]

Boko Haram in the Context of Global Jihadism

161

global nature are not properly articulated and therefore lack proper
foundation and context. This conceptualization is also important in
creating the right counterterrorism strategy.13 It is also necessary to
understand Boko Haram’s global status due to an increased focus
on tackling global jihadi movements.14
This Article aims to fill the gap in the literature through a
conceptual analysis of Boko Haram’s global nature and to utilize
that analysis to evaluate current counter-terrorism measures against
the group. This Article argues that status as a global jihadist
organization and hierarchy within the world’s global jihadist
movement is best evaluated on a three-criteria approach including
the indicators of conforming ideology, militant operations/targets,
and external relations or cooperation. It will be further argued that
these typologies are distinctly important not only to provide a more
comprehensive way of thinking of international terrorism but also
in fashioning proposed solutions to the Boko Haram situation.
Using this methodology, this Article argues that because of the
group’s less violent antecedent historical development, and because
of its tepid connection to larger global jihadist entrepreneurial
groups, and because of its situational leader-centric operational
priorities, Boko Haram presents fertile potential to arrive at
relatively non-violent solutions to the conflict in Northern Nigeria.
Moreover, Nigeria’s counter-terrorism approach, which is primarily
military-based and marred by corruption and massive human rights
abuses, 15 is unlikely to succeed due to a lack of a proper
conceptualization of Boko Haram’s evolution and its current status.
This Article will first review the literature in the field concerning
conceptualizations of the global jihadist frameworks and the place

13
For understanding the significance of contextualising terrorism before
analysing counterterrorism mechanisms see Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One
Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, 3 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 287 (2002).
14
See Jennifer Varriale Carson & Matthew Suppenbach, The Global Jihadist
Movement: The Most Lethal Ideology?, 22 HOMICIDE STUD. 8, 8-9 (2018).
15 See generally Victor Chidubem Iwuoha, United States’ Security Governance in
Nigeria: Implications on Counterterrorism Strategies Against Boko Haram, 54 J. ASIAN &
AFR. STUD. 1175 (2019) (discussing the state of corruption and human rights abuses
by the security and defense sectors in Nigeria).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

162

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:1

of the Boko Haram group in that framework. It will then analyze
those conceptualizations to develop fresh insights on the status and
potential of this group in the greater global context. Building upon
these insights, it will thereafter discuss protocols for countering
Boko Haram and the feasibility of adopting a causal model.
II. GLOBAL JIHADISM: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Modern global jihadism was arguably formed by three geopolitical conflicts: the Israel-Palestine conflict, generally,16 the 1979
Soviet war in Afghanistan, 17 and the 1990 stationing of American
troops in Saudi Arabia in the buildup to the Gulf War in Iraq. 18
These incidents created a pan-Islamic movement that sought to
battle with the ‘far enemy’ in addition to the ‘near enemy,’ as jihad
was traditionally understood. 19 This mobilization grew to other
territories that had Muslim populations, advocating for a rise
against the U.S., the West, and Israel, all of which were considered
an existential threat to the Islamic world.20 This was a change in
strategy for Islamist groups that were previously focused on local
grievances 21 like the self-determination struggles in Palestine and

16
See Meir Litvak, The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israel Conflict: The Case of
Hamas, 34 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 148, 149-150 (1998).
17
DANIEL BYMAN, AL QAEDA, THE ISLAMIC STATE, AND THE GLOBAL JIHADIST
MOVEMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 3 (2015).
18
ROBIN WRIGHT ET Al, THE JIHADI THREAT: ISIS, AL QAEDA, AND BEYOND 8
(2016/2017), https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/12/jihadi-threat-isis-alqaeda-and-beyond [https://perma.cc/6JTT-BR9F].
19
Mark D. Kielsgard & Tam Hey Juan Julian, The Second Front—Again? The
Rising Tide of Global Jihadism in East and Southeast Asia, 13 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 131, 137-38, 148 (2018).
20
See THURSTON, supra note 1, at 9.
21
Some commentators have rejected the categorization of all Islamic extremist
groups as part of global jihad, arguing that this decontextualization of conflicts only
serves the political interests of the groups as well as of those battling them. See, e.g.,
Caitriona Dowd & Clionadh Raleigh, The Myth of Global Islamic Terrorism and Local
Conflict in Mali and the Sahel, 112 AFR. AFFS. 498, 508-09 (2013).
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Chechnya. 22 The call to global jihadism was aligned with local
grievances through attribution of said grievances to the hegemonic
power of the United States, which had led to wars and allegedly
illegal occupations in majority-Muslim countries.23 Global jihadism
therefore became chiefly associated with Al-Qaeda and its founder,
Osama bin Laden, whose base was Afghanistan but which gradually
spread to many parts of the world. 24 Whereas Afghanistan
remained the organizational base of the group, many other extremist
groups who subscribed to the ideology were spread around the
world with direct and indirect links to Al-Qaeda.25 A number of
foreign fighters frequently traveled to Afghanistan for training
where Al-Qaeda had set up camps.26
The war in Afghanistan following 9/11 led to a significant
dismantling of the organizational structure of Al-Qaeda and the
weakening of global jihadism,27 but this empowered new frontiers
of global jihadism. 28 In fact, though this movement suffered
setbacks at the leadership level, its operational strategy shifted focus
to the greater autonomy of terrorist cells 29 and, significantly, to
similar ideologically-inspired groups in different parts of the world

22
Thomas Hegghammer, Global Jihadism After the Iraq War, 60 MIDDLE E.J. 11,
13 (2006).
23 Id.
24
See James W. Messerschmidt, Osama Bin Laden and His Jihadist Global
Hegemonic Masculinity, 32 GENDER & SOC’Y 663, 663-66 (2018) (discussing the
increasing global interest in Osama bin Laden’s jihadist messages).
25 See id.
26
DCI COUNTERTERRORIST CTR., CENT. INTEL. AGENCY, CTC-01-40004,
AFGHANISTAN:
AN
INCUBATOR
FOR
INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM
3-4
(2001), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/369161-2001-03-27-afghani
stan-an-incubator-for.html [https://perma.cc/KB8Y-GZX2]; see also, Daveed
Gartenstein-Ross & Nathaniel Barr, How Al-Qaeda Works: The Jihadist Group’s
Evolving
Organizational
Design,
HUDSON
INST.
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.hudson.org/research/14365-how-al-qaeda-works-the-jihadist-grou
p-s-evolving-organizational-design [https://perma.cc/8XR4-PQRR].
27
Bill Braniff & Assaf Moghadam, Towards Global Jihadism: Al-Qaeda’s
Strategic, Ideological and Structural Adaptations Since 9/11, 5 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 36,
36 (2011).
28 See id. at 36-37.
29
BYMAN, supra note 17, at 145.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

164

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:1

that were previously unaffiliated or loosely affiliated with AlQaeda.30 As noted in 2010 by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Al-Qaeda “has transformed into a diffuse global network
and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with
varying degrees of independence.”31
Some of these groups have networked in their different regions
under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda or created affiliations with AlQaeda. Such groups are reportedly active in North Africa, Yemen,
East Africa, and Southeast Asia. 32 Several other non-affiliated
groups have emerged over time that have followed the global
jihadist ideology and operations. 33 Although these groups are
driven by diverse local agendas, they find commonality in religious
ideology and opposition to the United States and the West. This
kind of association has been called the “Al Qaeda effect.” 34 This
effect becomes apparent when locally oriented Islamist groups
reinterpret their grievances through a global perspective, putting
the West at the center of their targets.35 Kielsgard and Tam have
described such groups as “second fronts” within the context of
global jihadism. 36 They describe second fronts as ”internal
insurrection by non-state parties within [their respective] territories

Gartenstein-Ross & Barr, supra note 26.
MAJORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., 111TH CONG., AL QAEDA IN
YEMEN AND SOMALIA: A TICKING TIME BOMB 5 (Comm. Print 2010),
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Yemen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T5WX-GCMG].
32 See, e.g., IS ‘Caliphate’ Defeated but Jihadist Group Remains a Threat, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45547595
[https://perma.cc/WC6Y-PPDH].
33
ANGEL RABASA ET AL., BEYOND AL-QAEDA: PART 2, THE OUTER RINGS OF THE
TERRORIST UNIVERSE 1-2 (2006).
34
See Zhang Lijun, Anti-Terrorism Alliance, BEIJING REV. (2004), reprinted in
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AL QAEDA 153, 155 (April Isaacs ed., 2006).
35
Braniff & Moghadam, supra note 27, at 43; see also Hakeem Onapajo, Ufo
Okeke Uzodike & Ayo Whetho, Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: The International
Dimension, 19 S. AFR. J. INT’L AFFS. 337, 338 (2012) (describing the Western role in
local grievances as “cultural imperialism and [the waging of] unjust wars in Muslim
countries”).
36
Kielsgard & Julian, supra note 19, at 145.
30
31
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in common cause to weaken the common enemy.”37 The common
enemy in this case is the United States and other Western countries
who are allied with Israel.38
One question arises as to how otherwise disparate groups with
imperfectly aligned agendas and territorial interests, inter alia, fit
within the global jihadist movements. This research takes the cue
from studies on Al-Qaeda, an organization which has sought to
promote a global jihadist agenda and has inspired similar likeminded groups in addition to its own affiliates globally.39 In that
regard, this Article has identified a three-criteria analysis to evaluate
whether a particular group can be regarded as part of the global
jihadi movement, and if so, to assess the vitality of the links between
the organization and the larger movement. These three key
indicators of a global jihadist organization are subscription to
ideology (including doctrine and goals), militant operations and
targets, and external relations.
Concerning the first criterion, the ideological basis of global
jihadist movements is founded on the Salafi sect whose followers
subscribe to “a strict literalist interpretation of the texts of the Quran
and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. They privilege armed
struggle (jihad) as a means for implementing their austere,
intolerant, and muscular vision of Islam.”40 Salafi jihadists believe
in taking up arms against the enemy, who in this context is the U.S.West axis that, according to them, has caused immense suffering of
Muslims in the countries where it has waged war or occupied

Id.
Id. at 139, 146 (describing a strategy of global jihadism that involves internal
uprisings by non-state parties within other territories to “weaken the common
enemy”).
39
Braniff & Moghadam, supra note 27, at 36-37.
40
Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern Stud., Princeton Univ., Inside
the Mind of ISIS: Understanding Its Goals and Ideology to Better Protect the
Homeland, Statement Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affs.,
114th
Cong.
(Jan.
20,
2016),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Haykel-2016-01-20.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7JNU-B68L].
37
38
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territories.41 However, pursuit of a similar ideology alone does not
necessarily mean that jihadist groups will find a common cause. In
fact, differences amongst such groups are common. For instance,
well known global jihadi movements like ISIS on the one hand, and
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates on the other, have often openly disagreed
on goals, tactics and even targets 42 —but both are rooted in the
Salafist ideology.43 Therefore, in this analysis, the focus will be the
degree to which Boko Haram has strictly manifested this ideology.
In regard to operations and targets, the second criterion, global
jihadi groups are often defined by their targeting of Western and
perceived Western interests in their operations. Furthermore, in
these operations, the groups exhibit a level of sophistication in
launching attacks, indicative of well-funded and high-level
coordinated training—a quality that would also relate to the third
criterion. This is evidence of the groups’ potential to reach beyond
local targets to transnational and global targets.
The third criterion focuses on understanding the group’s
linkages with transnational and global groups outside its usual base
of operation. This aspect is closely tied not only to ideological
congruence between extremist groups, but also to aims, tactics, and
targets. As groups align themselves with an Islamist ideology that

41
ROBERT G. RABIL, SALAFISM IN LEBANON: FROM APOLITICISM TO
TRANSNATIONAL JIHADISM 12 (2014).
42 See Bernard Haykel, ISIS and Al-Qaeda—What Are They Thinking?
Understanding the Adversary, 668 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 71, 75-79 (2016)
(describing the conflicts between Al-Qaeda and ISIS, which rose from their
disagreement on “ideological, tactical, and strategic matters”).
43
See Daniel L. Byman, Divisions Within the Global Jihad: A Primer, BROOKINGS
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/10/02/divisionswithin-the-global-jihad-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/5GHC-D3JF] (discussing the
difference between ISIS and Al-Qaeda in their approach to carrying out the Salafi
ideology); see also MICHAEL R. KELVINGTON, INT’L INST. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM,
GLOBAL SALAFI-JIHADISM IDEOLOGY: THE “SOFT POWER” OF THE ENEMY 1 (Int’l Inst. for
Counter-Terrorism
2019),
https://www.ict.org.il/images/Global%20SalafiJihadism-Enemy%20Soft%20Power.pdf [https://perma.cc/22PC-73WQ] (”While
both seek the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate, their vision for the
caliphate and the means through which it is realized vary.”).
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calls for the violent confrontation against a common enemy, these
groups engage at a certain level as associates or affiliates in the
global jihad. It is from these links that groups share in trainings,
tactics, and intelligence, and financially support each other.
Moreover, the strength of the linkages of the localized affiliate with
the broader global jihadi movement, provides insight into the
possibility of peaceful resolution to grievances of the local affiliate.
This would enable the policymakers to understand the extent of the
threat faced and how to resolve it as further discussed below.
III. BOKO HARAM IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL JIHADISM
a. Ideology and Goals
In assessing the ideology of an organization, analysis must go
beyond the organization’s publicly advanced goals—which can be
disingenuous and tend to be temporary, shifting with leadership
changes. Instead, the group’s origins and development should be
carefully reviewed to determine the group’s foundational ideology,
as well as to track the intellectual transformations it has experienced.
Boko Haram emerged in 2002 as Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunna
Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad, translated from Arabic as “People
Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad.”44
The stated goal of the group was “supporting Islamic education and
establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria.”45 The fundamental aim is
the propagation of traditional Islam with a focus on Nigeria,
especially the predominantly Muslim northern region of the
country. The group’s origins are deeply rooted in the politics of

44
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions
Committee Adds Boko Haram to Its Sanctions List, U.N. Press Release SC/11410
(May
22,
2014),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11410.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q7RK-4PAZ].
45 Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

168

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:1

northern Nigeria,46 but Boko Haram metamorphosed into an entity
with other opportunistic pursuits in the name of Islam. Boko Haram
has flirted with jihadism throughout the course of its history,
especially since 2010.47
An obvious advantage of adhering to the ideology of global
jihadism, despite having a specific set of purely domestic goals, is
that it allows Boko Haram to brand itself with wider values and aims
to develop broader consensus in northern Nigeria, international
support, and ideological prestige within the Muslim community.
Whilst extremist groups like Boko Haram are perhaps better
understood from the context in which they emerged and continue to
operate,48 it is also the case that these groups propagate an Islamist
ideology as a way of legitimizing themselves in the spaces in which
they operate. It is further the case that global organizations like AlQaeda have managed to inspire locally based extremist groups to
reframe their grievances through a global jihadist ideology. 49 As
argued by Kelvington:
“The Salafi-Jihadist ideology is the
intangible ‘soft power’ of the adversary, which violently contests
globalization and the international system, and fuels the continued
expansion of the global jihadist movement through selective citation
of Islamic texts, sensationally coercive methods of jihadist groups,
and dissemination of ideas on the Internet.”50

46
See, e.g., Higazi, Kendhammer, Mohammed, Pérouse de Montclos &
Thurston, supra note 12, at 205 (noting that the group’s initial rise is attributable to
corruption in Nigeria).
47
See THURSTON, supra note 1, at 17-18 (describing a series of Boko Haram’s
jihadist attacks following its re-emergence in 2010).
48
See Dowd & Raleigh, supra note 21, at 503-05 (arguing that domestic
contexts and issues are crucial to understanding the motivations and dynamics of
Islamist groups).
49
Braniff & Moghadam, supra note 27, at 41; see also WALKER, supra note 8, at
3 (noting that locals were referring to Boko Haram as “Nigerian Taliban” when it
emerged).
50
KELVINGTON, supra note 43, at 2.
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Boko Haram benefits politically by associating itself with other
global jihadi movements. 51 By pursuing a global jihadist agenda
simultaneously with a local agenda, Boko Haram has managed to
appeal to religious identity politics in the predominantly Muslim
north of Nigeria as it pursues other local interests. The local political
agenda has centered on the politics of dissociation from the Federal
Government and the South, which is predominantly Christian.52 By
infusing a Salafist jihadi ideology into its operations, Boko Haram
reinterprets the local political interests through the prism of this
ideology, which rejects Western influences it associates with the
South and the Federal Government.53 The group frames its armed
conflict against the Federal Government as justified in order to “oust
non-Islamic influence from traditionally Muslim lands en route to
establishing true Islamic governance in accordance with Sharia, or
God’s law.”54
On the other hand, global jihadist movements enjoy a mutually
beneficial relationship with local groups like Boko Haram by
propagandizing that national extremist groups are affiliates. This
serves to show the long arm of the global jihadist movement and
project its significant global power and influence by taking credit for
all activities perpetrated domestically by affiliates, in furtherance of

51
See SHOLA ABIDEMI OLABODE, DIGITAL ACTIVISM AND CYBERCONFLICTS IN
NIGERIA: OCCUPY NIGERIA, BOKO HARAM AND MEND 179 (Athina Karatzogianni ed.,
2018).
52
Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, No Retreat, No Surrender: Understanding the
Religious Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, 34 AFR. STUDY MONOGRAPHS 65, 67-68
(2013) (describing how Nigerians often identify more strongly with regional
religious groups than with political parties).
53
See Onapajo, Uzodike & Whetho, supra note 35, at 344-45 (discussing Boko
Haram’s hatred for southern Nigeria because of their higher levels of
Westernization).
54
JARRET M. BRACHMAN, GLOBAL JIHADISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 4 (2009). A
similar strategy is employed by the Somali based group, Al-Shabaab, who formed
associations with the marginalized north-eastern sector of Kenya, which has shared
ethnic and religious ties with Somalia and the coastal region. See Why Is Al Shabab
Making
Inroads
into
Kenya?,
TRT
WORLD
(Mar.
15,
2019),
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-is-al-shabab-making-inroads-into-ke
nya-24981 [https://perma.cc/DD29-63R8] (noting Al-Shabaab’s use of Islamic
dogma in recruiting and radicalizing young Kenyans).
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a global jihadist agenda, whether the global jihad played any role or
not. It is therefore more appropriate to analyze the association of
these groups at different levels: the pursuit of a domestic agenda
which could be political or economic and the furtherance of a global
Islamist agenda through domestic acts.
Another benefit to aligning domestic terror groups with
international jihadism, beyond simply marketing their groups'
branding, is the logistical and financial benefits from associating
with well-established global jihad movements.55 The benefits to the
international jihadist movement beyond the pervasive
dissemination of its ideology include dividing the perceived
Western enemies and obtaining intelligence on the ground. In effect,
the group’s two contexts of existence, local and global, complement
one another rather than conflict.
However, some scholars have argued for differentiation
between global and national goals when analyzing extremist
groups.56 What is lost in this approach is that extremist groups have
proven to be effective in pursuing both sets of goals in tandem. This
is made possible by the sharing of a base ideology among Islamic
extremist groups which enables these groups to vacillate swiftly
between a domestic agenda and a global one in their operations.
In the case of Boko Haram, the group has been chiefly associated
with politics in northern Nigeria, an area which is predominantly
Muslim. This group’s tactics and targets (discussed below) have,
however, promoted a broader Islamist agenda which resonates well
with other extremist groups.57
The diffuse character or lack of clarity in Boko Haram’s
ideological leanings and goals, however, can be attributed to the
shifting priorities of its leadership, which have also resulted in
several splinter groups dissociating themselves from the main

55
Zachary Abuza, Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network, 24
CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 427, 428 (2002).
56 See, e.g., Dowd & Raleigh, supra note 21, at 503.
57
By mainly targeting Christians and adopting tactics that are well known to
be employed by global jihadists like suicide bombings, the group has promoted the
global jihadi agenda and shown potential to further it.
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group.58 Immediate goals of the group have been set at the whim of
successive leadership which is often defined by the prior affiliations
with other extremist groups or immediate tactical and financial
links. For instance, during its first phase (2002-09), the group’s focus
was driven by the philosophical ideals of Mohammed Yusuf who
emphasized the rejection of Western education,59 and sought to copy
the Taliban’s imposition of a strict Islamic lifestyle. 60 At its
inception, the group was colloquially known as the ”Nigerian
Taliban.”61 Boko Haram’s earlier activities were also associated with
the charismatic demeanor of Mohammed Yusuf who was an
admirer of Bin Laden, and was keen to establish an Islamic state in
northern Nigeria, akin to what the Taliban had done in
Afghanistan.62
Following Yusuf’s death in 2009, Boko Haram’s perceived
radical turn during the second phase (from 2010 onwards) was
largely a result of the leadership shift under Shekau. Shekau’s
leadership has been defined by indiscriminately brutal tactics that
are commonly perceived as contrary to even extreme Islamist
ideology like kidnapping and keeping Muslim schoolgirls as

58
Boko Haram in Nigeria: Split Emerges over Leadership, BBC (July 16, 2018)
[hereinafter Split Emerges over Leadership], https://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-36973354 [https://perma.cc/AW8C-NKXM].
59
In an interview with the BBC, Muhammad Yusuf is quoted as saying,
”There are prominent Islamic preachers who have seen and understood that the
present Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our
beliefs in Islam.” Joe Boyle, Nigeria’s ‘Taliban’ Enigma, BBC (last updated July 31,
2009,
8:13
AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8172270.stm
[https://perma.cc/S3YC-JZ3Y].
60
See COOK, supra note 11, at 9.
61 See Boyle, supra note 59. But see id. at n.29 (noting that the Boko Harm
Manifesto found online does not align with Yusuf’s approach and is most likely not
a work of Yusuf).
62
Ryan Cummings, A Jihadi Takeover Bid in Nigeria? The Evolving Relationship
Between Boko Haram and Al-Qa`ida, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. SENTINEL, Dec. 2017,
at
24,
24,
https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CTCSentinel_Vol10Iss11-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC4B-D9NJ].
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slaves.63 Differences over tactics and targets have led to splits within
the group.64
Despite the marked difference in approaches during the two
phases, the consistent unifying factor that continues to define the
group is its Salafist jihadi base ideology. The group has advocated
for an Islamic state in Nigeria and rejected Western ideals of
government since its inception. Yet, the Salafist ideology does not
in itself require a jihadist response to domestic problems or the
targeting of Western or international targets. It does not preclude
the use of non-violent solutions except perhaps in its most radical
iterations. The Boko Haram under Yusuf called for adherence to
strict Islamic teachings in northern Nigeria but did not seek to
export it or engage in violent tactics. Thus, the form of Salafism to
which the group adheres was, and may eventually be again,
temperate enough to take on a local non-violent form—perhaps
through semi-autonomous political and economic power sharing
with the federal government.
b. Operations and Targets
For a long time, Boko Haram’s operations and targets were
localized. Its attacks were on local political targets like prisons,65 but
these subsequently escalated to churches, schools and other
government installations.66 For that reason, most commentators had
dismissed the group’s activities as a local insurgency without

63
See Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram’s Ultra-Extremist Side Resurfaces: From the
Execution of Mamman Nur to Humanitarian Workers, 16 TERRORISM MONITOR, Oct. 19,
2018, at 8, 8 (2018), https://jamestown.org/program/boko-harams-ultraextremist-side-resurfaces-from-the-execution-of-mamman-nur-to-humanitarian-w
orkers/ [https://perma.cc/D75C-3QAK].
64
JONATHAN R. WHITE, TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY 166 (9th ed. 2017).
65
See ALEXANDER THURSTON, BOKO HARAM: THE HISTORY OF AN AFRICAN
JIHADIST MOVEMENT 208 (2018).
66
See WHITE, supra note 64.
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significant links to international jihadism.67 Initially, the group was
not perceived as posing a threat to the United States and other
Western intelligence communities or the interests of their allies.68
The threat changed in 2011 when Boko Haram launched attacks
on the Federal Police headquarters and the United Nations building
in Abuja. 69 These attacks were different in character and
significance from previous attacks. It was the first time the group
had employed suicide bombings, a relatively common tactic with
global jihadi movements, indicating some form of association or
tactical training with these well-established movements such as AlQaeda.70 The trend of suicide bombings took a new direction in 2014
when the group started deploying female suicide bombers. 71

67
See, e.g., Higazi, Kendhammer, Mohammed, Pérouse de Montclos &
Thurston, supra note 12.
68
See S. COMM. ON COUNTERTERRORISM & INTEL. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.,
112TH CONG., BOKO HARAM: EMERGING THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND 1 (Comm.
Print
2011),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT112HPRT71725/pdf/CPRT-112HPRT71725.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NG5-V8X7;
see also WALKER, supra note 8, at 3 (“In a 2004 U.S. State Department cable, revealed
by Wikileaks, the U.S. embassy in Abuja concluded the group did not present an
international threat and likely had no links to international jihadist
organizations.”).
69
Deadly Blast Hits UN Office in Nigeria, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 26, 2011),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/08/26/deadly-blast-hits-un-office-in-ni
geria/ [https://perma.cc/T2V9-Q66Y]. For more information on the attacks See
HARVEY MATHIEU GUIDÈRE, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 79
(2nd ed. 2017) and HARVEY J. SINDIMA, MAJOR ISSUES IN ISLAM: THE CHALLENGES
WITHIN AND WITHOUT 119 (2018).
70
See Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram’s al-Qaeda Affiliation: A Response to ‘Five Myths
about
Boko
Haram,’
LAWFARE
(Feb.
1,
2018,
7:00
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/boko-harams-al-qaeda-affiliation-response-fivemyths-about-boko-haram [https://perma.cc/7HQJ-AQN3] (explaining that the
Boko Haram attacks on the Federal Police headquarters and the United Nations
building were the first suicide bombings in Nigeria, and describing other similar
suicide bombings committed by Al-Shabaab).
71
FREEDOM C. ONUOHA & TEMILOLA A. GEORGE, AL JAZEERA CTR. FOR STUD.,
BOKO HARAM'S USE OF FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBING IN NIGERIA 2 (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://studies.aljazeera.net/sites/default/files/articles/reports/documents/20
153189319985734Boko-Harams-Female.pdf [https://perma.cc/74E6-UMXK]; see
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However, it should be noted that the use of suicide bombing was
certainly not a novel idea by 2011 and therefore not dispositive of
any truly significant connection between Boko Haram and other
international jihadist groups. Second, the target of the attacks,
which had been locally oriented, took a global turn when the group
launched its attack on the United Nations. 72 However, some
scholars argue that since the group has not launched any further
attacks on international targets, the attack on the United Nations
should be considered a one-off event perhaps intended to
“embarrass the Nigerian government,” or as a means to reciprocate
the support the group had received from other global jihadi
movements.73
Nevertheless, the attack on the United Nations in Abuja was a
significant event for a group that had previously been thought of as
a local militant group interested only in Nigeran politics.
Contextually, these attacks came as the backdrop of what has come
to be considered the beginning of the group’s second phase which
was ushered in after the group retreated following the extra-judicial
killing of its leader, Muhammad Yusuf in 2009.74 Upon reemerging
in 2010, the group’s then temporary leader, Sani Umar, had made it
clear that its targets were not restricted to within Nigeria.75

also Macpherson U. Nnam, Mercy Chioma Arua & Mary Sorochi Otu, The Use of
Women and Children in Suicide Bombing by the Boko Haram Terrorist Group in Nigeria,
42 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 35, 35-36 (2018) (detailing the increased use by
Boko Haram of women and children in terrorist attacks).
72
See SINDIMA, supra note 69.
73
WALKER, supra note 8, at 9.
74
See Omar Mahmoud, Local, Global, or in Between? Boko Haram’s Messaging,
Strategy, Membership, and Support Networks, in BOKO HARAM BEYOND THE HEADLINES
87, 88 (Jacob Zenn ed., 2018).
75
Ioannis Mantzikos, Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries:
A Chronology of Attacks, 8 PERSP. ON TERRORISM 63, no. 6 (2014),
www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/391/html
[https://perma.cc/VSN2-Q4R8]; see also Explaining Boko Haram, Nigeria's Islamist
Insurgency,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
10,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/world/africa/boko-haram-in-nigeria.ht
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Further, dismissing the attack on the United Nations as a one-off
event fails to appreciate its symbolic significance. As noted in a
study that analyzed various terrorist groups, “The percentages of
attacks against foreigners . . . do not describe the entire situation.”76
Indeed, such attacks, even in small numbers, indicate a potential for
similar attacks when an opportunity presents itself.77 It is alleged
that Boko Haram wanted to “send a message to the U.S. President”
through the suicide bombing. 78 Moreover, the significance of the
United Nations attack should be seen according to the relatively
high number of casualties (23 deaths).79 On the other hand, in the
years since the attack, the Boko Haram group has failed to pursue a
strategy of targeting international or Western targets, 80 giving
further credence to the one-off theory.
However, the two attacks led to increased international focus on
Boko Haram’s activities through the significant media attention it
received, 81 and subsequent interest within the intelligence
community in the United States.82 The attacks were also important

ml [https://perma.cc/XGL4-M66N]; Michael Nwankpa, Making Nigeria
Ungovernable (2009-2012), in THE BOKO HARAM READER (Abdulbasit Kassim &
Michael Nwankpa eds., 2018) (describing Boko Haram’s alleged role in the 2013
kidnapping of a French family).
76
BONNIE CORDES, BRIAN M. JENKINS & KONRAD KELLEN, A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING TERRORIST GROUPS 49 (1985).
77 Cf. id. at 48-49 (discussing how, among terrorist organizations that target
foreigners, many focus less than fifteen percent of their activity on these attacks).
78
Nigeria UN Bomb: Video of ‘Boko Haram Bomber’ Released, BBC (Sept. 18, 2011),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14964554
[https://perma.cc/X4BTEQGY].
79
Id.
80
Heidi Schultz, Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Who Are They and What Do They Want?,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(May
8,
2014),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/5/140507-boko-haram-nigeri
a-borno-state-maiduguri-mohammed-yusuf-abubukar-shekau-goodluck-jonathan
-world/ [https://perma.cc/F3Q5-AKES].
81
Ngozi Akinro, Covering the Boko Haram Crisis Beyond the Nation:
Analysis of Shifting Time and Space Frames in News Reporting, 82 INT’L COMM.
GAZETTE 189, 195 (2020).
82 Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43881, Nigeria’s 2015 Election
and the Boko Haram Crisis 7 (2015), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=762116
[https://perma.cc/YLB9-RM2Z].
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in not only understanding the evolution of the group through its
tactical and technical capacity, but also the dangers it posed to
foreign—especially Western and perceived Western targets. It was
indicative of a group that was taking a different trajectory and
joining the ranks of other global jihadi movements. As noted by a
commentator, “the United Nations attack is much more in line with
other [global terrorist] organizations, and is strongly reminiscent of
the suicide attack in Baghdad against the United Nations in August
2003, which was one of the opening blows of the Iraqi insurgency.”83
The same sentiments were also expressed by General Carter Ham,
former commander of the United States Africa Command
(AFRICOM), who noted that the attack indicated the possibility of
ties with other jihadist movements like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab.84
Subsequent Boko Haram targets have been almost entirely local
with the group having instead stepped up attacks on churches and
schools. 85 However, the group has continued the use of suicide
bombers, further re-enforcing the perception that it has enhanced its
tactical and technical capabilities—an indication of foreign technical
and training assistance.86 As discussed below, the group’s use of

83
David Cook, The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, 4 COMBATING TERRORISM CTR.
SENTINEL,
Sept.
2011,
at
3,
5,
https://ctc.usma.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JZRG4PS].
84 Abuja Attack: Car Bomb Hits Nigeria UN Building, BBC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2011),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14677957
[https://perma.cc/Y7J5LEPJ].
85
See Michael Ibanga & James Archibong, The Boko Haram Insurgency:
Characterisation and Implications Under Municipal and International Laws, in BOKO
HARAM & INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 141 (John-Mark Iyi & Hennie Strydom eds.,
2018).
86
See, e.g., Ely Karmon, Boko Haram’s International Reach, 8 PERSP. ON
TERRORISM 74, 75-76 (2014) (noting that Boko Haram’s suicide attacks were AQIM’s
signature tactic, and the attack on the United Nations headquarters was comparable
to AQIM’s attack on the United Nations offices in Algiers on December 11, 2007);
see also Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram’s Fluctuating Affiliations: Future Prospects for
Realignment with al-Qa`ida, in BOKO HARAM BEYOND THE HEADLINES 115, 124 (Jacob
Zenn ed., 2018) (attributing the suicide bombing technical skills to possible training
abroad with AQIM and Al-Shabaab).
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suicide bombing to launch attacks—a technique that is linked to AlQaeda and Al-Shabaab—suggests that Boko Haram may have
received external technical and training assistance. 87 Further, in
2014, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of an
estimated 200 Chibok schoolgirls, triggering global alarm. 88
Kidnapping is a technique associated with its splinter group,
Ansaru, Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (The Supporters
for the Aid of Muslims in Black Africa), which has carried out a
number of kidnappings in Nigeria. 89 However, neither suicide
bombing nor mass kidnapping techniques provide definitive
evidence of Boko Haram’s ties to international jihadism as they are
easily as likely to be copy-cat attacks. It certainly provides little
insight into the vitality of external linkages, ambitions, or goals—
particularly in light of how few international targets Boko Haram
has attacked in recent years.
Ansaru has been more forthright about the global dimension in
its targeting with the group being associated with kidnappings of
foreign nationals, as well as directing attacks against Nigerian
security personnel. 90 Ansaru has claimed responsibility for the
kidnapping and execution of seven foreign workers of a Lebanese

87
See, e.g., Katherine Zimmerman, From Somalia to Nigeria: Jihad, WKLY.
STANDARD (June 18, 2011, 9:29 AM), reprinted in WASH. EXAM’R,
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/from-somalia-to-niger
ia-jihad [https://perma.cc/V64E-J67T]. Zimmerman quotes a written statement
from Boko Haram that said, “Very soon, we will wage jihad . . . . We want to make
it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they
received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country
ungovernable . . . . This time round, our attacks will be fiercer and wider than they
have been.” Id.
88
See Abubakar, supra note 2.
89
Alexander Smith, Ansaru: Boko Haram Splinter Group Sows Terror in Nigeria,
NBC
NEWS
(Apr.
10,
2016,
12:31
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-nigeria-schoolgirls/ansaru-bokoharam-splinter-group-sows-terror-nigeria-n551661
[https://perma.cc/TKF7WN68].
90
See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions
Committee Adds Abubakar Mohammed Shekau, Ansaru to Its Sanctions List, U.N.
Press Release SC/11455 (June 26, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release].
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construction company 91 and launched an attack on a Nigerian
military convoy that was set to join an Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) military campaign against Islamic
militants in Mali. 92 The attack on the Nigerian military convoy
resulted in the death of two peacekeepers and was orchestrated to
express displeasure with Nigeria’s collaboration with France in
Mali.93 Further, Ansaru’s employment of kidnapping as a technique
has been linked to training with AQIM.94
Significantly, Ansaru’s split from Boko Haram was precipitated
by disputes over targets. The splinter group’s self-declared leader
at its formation, Abu Usamata Al’Ansari, criticized Boko Haram’s
targeting of fellow Muslims in northern Nigeria rather than
Christians and Western interests. 95 Ansaru, therefore, set out to
establish itself as a terrorist organization along the lines of Al-Qaeda
with an objective of attacking international and foreign targets,
something that sets it apart from Boko Haram.96
Boko Haram sets a distinct footprint from its splinter groups and
remains largely a group with a national agenda. The one-off attack

91
Nigeria Islamists Ansaru claim Bauchi Setraco Seizures, BBC NEWS (Feb. 18,
2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21497044
[https://perma.cc/6ENV-BEUQ]; Nigeria Islamists ‘Kill Foreign Hostages,’
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
9,
2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/09/nigerian-islamists-kill-fore
ign-hostages [https://perma.cc/WYL8-2QAX].
92
Isaac Abrak & Tim Cocks, Islamists Ansaru Claim Attack on Mali-Bound
Nigeria
Troops:
Paper,
REUTERS
(Jan.
20,
2013,
10:39
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence/islamists-ansaru-claim-att
ack-on-mali-bound-nigeria-troops-paper-idUSBRE90J0B520130120.
93
U.N. Press Release, supra note 90.
94
Zenn, supra note 86.
95
See Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Boko Haram and Politics: From
Insurgency to Terrorism, in 2 BOKO HARAM: ISLAMISM, POLITICS, SECURITY AND THE
STATE IN NIGERIA 135, 140 (Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos ed., 2014); see also
Boko Haram: Splinter Group, Ansaru Emerges, VANGUARD NEWS (Feb. 1, 2012, 5:06
AM),
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/boko-haram-splinter-groupansaru-emerges/ [https://perma.cc/C3R9-3Y96].
96
Jacob Zenn, Cooperation of Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali
Intervention, 6 COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. SENTINEL, March. 2013, 1, 1-2 (2013),
https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss31.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CG2F-8QTM].
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on the United Nations building and the use of kidnapping and
suicide bombing fail to make out a convincing case for notable
changes to its core domestic ambitions. More importantly, the
selection of its targets—largely in Nigeria—serves practical rather
than ideological goals. The local-only targeting practices of Boko
Haram reveal that it does not see itself as a significant part of the
larger global jihad movement and suggest that local solutions would
tend to be more effective.
c. External Links
Boko Haram’s alleged external linkages have largely been
dictated by the whims of successive leadership and can be described
as ad hoc at best. There is “little evidence,” for instance, to suggest
that at its founding Boko Haram had direct links with Al-Qaeda or
its affiliates.97 Thus, it would be highly inaccurate to classify it as a
mere extension or a cell.98 However, there is evidence that Boko
Haram, through its leadership over time, trainings, and operations,
has maintained various links with other foreign fighters and global
jihadi movements that point towards an ideological congruence and
coordinated efforts to wage jihad with these other groups.99
The first indicative external ties with global jihadi movements
developed in the early stages of the group when one of its leaders,
Yusuf Ahmed, collaborated with a member of AQIM, Ibrahim
Harun, for training of Boko Haram members in Niger. 100

JOHN CAMPBELL, NIGERIA: DANCING ON THE BRINK 139-40 (updated ed. 2013).
Cf. Zenn, supra note 11, at 174-76 (arguing that Boko Haram’s founding was
linked to Al-Qaeda through funding and logistical support with an hypothesis that
was based on alleged prior links of one of the founding leaders with Al-Qaeda but
this is not sufficient to show how Al-Qaeda influenced Boko Haram’s creation more
than merely motivating the group).
99
Daniel E. Agbiboa, Identity, Deprivation, Terror: Why Boko Haram Rebels, in
UNDERSTANDING BOKO HARAM: TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN AFRICA 109, 120
(James J. Hentz & Hussein Solomon eds., 2017).
100
See Zenn, supra note 11, at 174 (detailing Boko Haram’s collaboration with
their affiliate groups, as well as Al-Shabaab, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and their affiliates).
97
98
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Mohammed Yusuf, who was the leader of the group from 2002 until
his death in 2010, allegedly obtained funding from Al-Qaeda of up
to $3 million dollars,101 but there is no evidence that Boko Haram
maintained any links with Al-Qaeda in terms of logistics, training,
and choice of targets. Moreover, $3 million dollars is a paltry sum
in the context of a broad social movement. Instead, during
Muhammad Yusuf’s leadership in the first phase, the group was
largely focused on local politics in Nigeria.102
Subsequently, Boko Haram has at different times declared its
allegiance to other global jihadi movements. 103 These shifting
allegiances are determined mainly by the existing leadership of the
group. In 2009, Sani Umar who briefly assumed the group’s
leadership declared that, “Boko Haram is just a version of the Al
Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin
Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country
is totally Islamized which is according to the wish of Allah.”104 After
the death of Muhammad Yusuf in 2010, his deputy, Abubakar
Shekau took over leadership and immediately declared his intention
to associate with Al-Qaeda.105 This was after Abdelmalik Droukdel,
the leader of AQIM, had publicly offered assistance to Boko

101
Terrence McCoy, This is How Boko Haram Funds Its Evil, WASH. POST (June
6, 2014, 3:29 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2014/06/06/this-is-how-boko-haram-funds-its-evil/
[https://perma.cc/AQM6-TPM2].
102
See AKBAR AHMED, THE THISTLE AND THE DRONE: HOW AMERICA’S WAR ON
TERROR BECAME A GLOBAL WAR ON TRIBAL ISLAM 129 (2013).
103
Robert Crowley & Henry Wilkinson, Boko Haram: A New Threat in West
Africa, in WEST AFRICAN STUDIES CONFLICT OVER RESOURCES AND TERRORISM: TWO
FACETS OF INSECURITY 99, 105 (Marie Trémolières ed., 2013).
104
COOK, supra note 11, at 14.
105
Jacob Zenn, Nigerian Al-Qaedaism, 16 CURRENT TRENDS ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY
99, 108 (2014).
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Haram. 106 AQIM allegedly trained personnel and financially
assisted Boko Haram following this announcement in 2010.107
Further, in 2011, Shekau directly sought Al-Qaeda’s technical
and financial support.108 Despite indicating that he supported the
Al-Qaeda cause, and the existence of evidence to show that the
group became more lethal in its attacks and tactics—demonstrating
possible assistance from outside—there is no evidence Shekau was
otherwise able to establish proper links with Al-Qaeda.109 Instead,
in 2015, Shekau pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the
leader of ISIS/ISIL.110 This declaration of allegiance was accepted
by ISIS/ISIL and precipitated Boko Haram’s change of name from
Jama`at Ahl al-Sunna li- Da`wa wa-l-Jihad, to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi
Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiya, meaning, Islamic State’s West Africa Province
(ISWAP)111 —although this later became a separate splinter group
which dissociated itself from the Shekau-led Boko Haram.112 These
seeming ad hoc affiliations provide evidence of only half-hearted
allegiance of Boko Haram to global jihadi movements. In nearly
every instance when a collaboration was announced it did not
include significant joint operations, was only as robust a connection
as the current leadership willed, lacked continuity, and often led to
Boko Haram splintering into sub-groups. Boko Haram also failed to
initiate significant regional attacks outside of Nigeria, which would
have advanced the global jihadi enterprise as truly global in scope.

106
THURSTON, supra note 65, at 165. In a letter to Boko Haram, Droukdel is
quoted as writing, “We are ready to train your men . . . in how to deal with weapons,
and to help you however we can, whether with men, weapons, supplies, or
equipment, to enable you to defend our people in Nigeria.” Id.
107 Id.
108
Cummings, supra note 62, at 25.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 24.
111
John Bugnacki, What’s in a Name?: Boko Haram Renames Itself the Islamic
State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), AM. SEC. PROJECT (May 12, 2015),
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/whats-in-a-name-boko-haram-rename
s-itself-the-islamic-states-west-africa-province-iswap/[https://perma.cc/FUE63QTU].
112
Zenn, supra note 86, at 115-17.
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The exact nature of the ties between Boko Haram and global
jihadist organizations is complex because of the various splinter
groups. However, the mainstream group stepped away from its
association with Al-Qaeda in 2015 when it claimed allegiance with
ISIS. 113 Its association with ISIS deteriorated to the extent that in
August 2016 ISIS unilaterally announced new leadership for Boko
Haram switching from Shekau to Abu Musab al-Barnawi,114 which
failed to materialize, but did occasion another split in the Boko
Haram group.115 Weak external ties also is evidenced by the poor
state of Boko Haram’s finances, which points to very limited
financial assistance from either Al-Qaeda or ISIS or its affiliates.116
Another potential indication of external links with other jihadist
movements is transnational presence. It has been argued that a lack
of a transnational presence should necessarily be seen as a factor that
militates against existence of a coordinated global agenda.117 Most
local extremist groups start out primarily engaged in an agenda that
is focused on their locality, the near enemy. However, extremist
groups will eventually push a political, religious, or economic
agenda within the regions where they exist, or even beyond, often
borrowing inspiration, tactics, and ideology from other violent
extremist groups. 118 Boko Haram seems to take a different path
pursuing a less robust regional agenda—though even this is
transient depending on the leadership in place at any given time,
internal organizational struggles, and external relations with other
extremist groups.

113
COUNTER
EXTREMISM
PROJECT,
BOKO
HARAM
2,
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/boko-haram
[https://perma.cc/CTP3-2G2X] (last visited Sept. 22, 2020).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 4.
116 Id.
117
Dowd & Raleigh, supra note 21, at 504.
118
See generally EKATERINA STEPANOVA, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RSCH. INST.,
TERRORISM IN ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICT: IDEOLOGICAL AND STRUCTURAL ASPECTS
(2008) (arguing that violent Islamist movements can only be effectively challenged
through nationalist movements).
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Even though initially started as a localized group, Boko Haram
and its splinter, Ansaru, have engaged in some initiatives with
transnational and global presence. Boko Haram operates from
within the Nigerian borders but also from the region of Lake Chad
where it has established camps. 119 However, the presence in the
Lake Chad region is out of convenience as the region provides a safe
haven for the group which has been largely driven out of its initial
base of Yobe and Borno States through Nigeria’s counter-insurgency
efforts.120 Even though Boko Haram’s primary operating theater is
within Nigeria (mostly in the north), the group has engaged in
limited attacks in neighboring countries such as the Cameroon
attack (on a police station in Kousseri) in 2014,121 the Niger attack
(on Niamey prison) in 2013,122 and more recently in the Chad attack
(on an army base at Dangdala) in 2019. 123 These attacks have
however been associated with freeing fellow militants (Cameroon &
Chad)124 or to smuggle weapons (Niger)125 and have little bearing on
the advancement of the global jihadi agenda and are rightly
considered isolated exceptions. The ability to launch transnational

119
See INT’L CRISIS GRP., FIGHTING BOKO HARAM IN CHAD: BEYOND MILITARY
MEASURES (Mar. 8, 2017), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/246-fightingboko-haram-in-chad-beyond-military-measures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E3DXCOUNCIL
REP.,
L3ER];
see
also
Chronology
of
Events,
SEC.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/lake-chad-basin.php
[https://perma.cc/77WS-EKCD] (revised May 4, 2020).
120 See Nigerian Troops Repel Boko Haram Insurgents in Yobe State, SAHARA REPS.
(Apr. 21, 2020), http://saharareporters.com/2020/04/21/nigerian-troops-repelboko-haram-insurgents-yobe-state [https://perma.cc/V4AY-ERQX].
121
Cameroon-Chad Border Crossing Closed After Attack, WORLD BULL. (May 6,
2014
2:22
PM)
[hereinafter
Cameroon-Chad
Border
Crossing],
https://www.worldbulletin.net/africa/cameroon-chad-border-crossing-closedafter-attack-h135613.html [https://perma.cc/5LGG-RTGS].
122
Niamey Prison Break: Niger Confirms 22 Escaped, BBC NEWS (June 2, 2013)
[hereinafter Niamey Prison Break], https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa22749230 [https://perma.cc/Q62Q-G2VL].
123
Boko Haram Militants Kill 23 Soldiers in Chad, DW NEWS (Mar. 22, 2019),
https://www.dw.com/en/boko-haram-militants-kill-23-soldiers-in-chad/a-48025
225 [https://perma.cc/UT8X-78VH].
124 Cameroon-Chad Border Crossing, supra note 121.
125 Niamey Prison Break, supra note 122.
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attacks, however, does speak to the group’s capabilities and
sophistication over time. Ansaru, on the other hand, has associated
itself with AQIM and adopts a more internationalist agenda.126
In the same vein, there have been reports of Nigerian fighters
fighting alongside AQIM in Mali, 127 but evidence that these are
associated with Boko Haram has been anecdotal.128 It is possible
that some of these fighters could have had a previous association
with the group but owing to Boko Haram’s allegiance to ISIL, they
are most likely affiliated with Ansaru, if they have any affiliation at
all.
Closer to home, Boko Haram has had what may be seen as an
‘internal-external’ collaboration with Ansaru which is borne out of
necessity as they battle their common enemy, the Nigerian Army.129
Particularly, this cooperation is key to Ansaru’s survival after
suffering military setbacks from the Nigerian Army onslaught that
largely drove it out of northeast Nigeria.130 It is alleged that since

126
Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram’s International Connections, 6 COMBATING
TERRORISM CTR. SENTINEL, Jan. 2013, at 7, 12 (2013), https://ctc.usma.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM78JYW3].
127
See Zenn, supra note 11, at 182.
128
See COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT, AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB
(AQIM)
24,
https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/threat_pdf/Al-Qaeda%
20in%20the%20Islamic%20Maghreb%20%28AQIM%29-10232020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TQ3H-67WW].
129
Boko Haram and Ansaru may differ on tactics but they have common
interests that bind them together. As noted by Zenn:

Ansaru and Boko Haram still revere Boko Haram founder Muhammad
Yusuf, and their members may move fluidly between groups and form
partnerships to target mutual enemies: the Nigerian government, France
and the West. They may also collaborate on refining their tactics as well
as expanding their areas of operations to locate new targets and eliminate
Western and Christian influence from Nigeria and the region.
Zenn, supra note 96, at 8.
130
See Alexis Akwagyiram, Nigerian Army Says It Arrests Leader of Islamist
Militant
Group
Ansaru,
REUTERS
(Apr.
4,
2016,
4:45
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence/nigerian-army-says-it-arre
sts-leader-of-islamist-militant-group-ansaru-idUSKCN0X10NK.
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2013 the two groups have been intermittently working together but
without official cooperation, though the intelligence on this is
sketchy. 131 Boko Haram has acknowledged this collaboration by
confirming that the two groups worked together in the kidnapping
of French priest Father Georges Vandenbeusch in northern
Cameroon in 2013. 132 Even then, Ansaru continues to express
disdain for Shekau’s leadership signaling no likelihood that they can
work together beyond a few collaborations.133 In some cases though,
these ad hoc collaborations have contributed to enhancing Boko
Haram’s technical and tactical capacity.134
Boko Haram’s external linkages with international jihadist
groups and its own splinter groups can be characterized as
uncommitted associations of convenience. There has been little
sharing of intelligence, aid, financial support, logistical support, and

131
See John Campbell, Are Nigeria’s Boko Haram and Ansaru Getting Back
Together?,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELS.
(Nov.
20,
2013),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/are-nigerias-boko-haram-and-ansaru-getting-back-tog
ether [https://perma.cc/5PRP-255N].
132 See French Priest ‘Kidnapped’ by Nigeria’s Boko Haram in Cameroon, WORLD
WATCH
MONITOR
(Nov.
19,
2013),
https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2013/11/french-priest-kidnapped-by-nig
erias-boko-haram-in-cameroon/ [https://perma.cc/C6RH-VAFN] (quoting an
anonymous source as saying, “I can confirm that the French priest is in the hands
of Mujahideen [fighters] from Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad [Boko
Haram’s Arabic name], who carried out the operation that was co-ordinated with
Ansaru”); see also Experts Puzzled by French Priest Kidnap Claim, RFI (Nov. 16, 2013,
10:24 AM), http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20131116-experts-puzzled-french-cameroonpriest-kidnap-claim [https://perma.cc/G4YU-AT5G] (stating that analysts were
confused by claims of cooperation between Boko Haram and Ansaru).
133
See Jacob Zenn, Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria, 7
COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. SENTINEL, Feb. 2014, at 23, 25-26 (2014),
https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5CXM-23YT].
134
Zenn identifies four areas that Boko Haram would have benefitted from
collaborating with its splinter groups: kidnapping, suicide bombing, raids on
military barracks, and media narratives. See Zenn, supra note 86, at 125-26
(describing how collaboration between Boko Haram and splinter groups benefitted
Boko Haram’s operations).
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few joint operations.135 Boko Haram has had shifting alliances with
Al-Qaeda or ISIS and its own splinter groups. Moreover, the weight
of the evidence shows that international jihadist organizations have
little influence on either Boko Haram’s leadership or its members, as
any embryonic bonds have been broken by Boko Haram’s targeting
of fellow Muslims 136 and ISIS’s failed attempt to install new
leadership in the group and depose Shekau.137 Also, Boko Haram’s
linkages with its own splinter groups are similarly ill-defined.
IV. COUNTERING THE BOKO HARAM THREAT
Nigeria’s counterterrorism measures have been multifaceted but
with a primary focus on military crackdown. The government has
employed what can be considered as hard and soft responses to the
insurgency. The hard measures involving military and law
enforcement. 138
The soft measures have focused on de-

135
Freedom C. Onuoha, Danger Not to Nigeria Alone: Boko Haram's
Transnational Reach and Regional Responses, FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG PEACE AND
SEC. SERIES NO. 17, Nov. 2014, at 1, 6-7, http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueros/nigeria/11066.pdf [https://perma.cc/RFU2-K4PH].
136
See John Campbell, Suspected Leadership Changes to IS-Backed Boko Haram
Faction
Continue,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.
(Mar.
12,
2019),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/suspected-leadership-changes-backed-boko-haram-fa
ction-continue [https://perma.cc/WGA9-EDSU].
137
See Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram Faction Releases Book on History and Ideology,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-haramfaction-releases-book-history-and-ideology [https://perma.cc/23GY-JM63]; see
also Split Emerges Over Leadership, supra note 58 (describing the conflict over control
of Boko Haram between Abubakar Shekau and Abu Musab al-Barnawi).
138
See Kingsley Omonobi, Ben Agande & Ndahi Marama, Military Bombards
Terrorists’
Camps,
VANGUARD
(May
17,
2013,
7:04
AM),
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/05/military-bombards-terrorists-camps
[https://perma.cc/96WA-FUFJ] (discussing the deployment of troops to regions in
Nigeria under a state of emergency); see also Ola’ Audu, Nigerian Military to Continue
Sambisa Forest Operation After Killing Over 20 Boko Haram Suspects in Raid, PREMIUM
TIMES (May 17, 2013), https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/134770-
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radicalization and community policing. 139 Progress has arguably
been made in reducing the threat posed by the insurgents,140 but the
measures employed so far have proved insufficient in the long term.
The counterterrorism measures need to be addressed against the
backdrop of the above conceptual analysis of Boko Haram in order
to proffer insightful prospects for dealing with the insurgency.
a. Military Approach
The Nigerian government’s main response to Boko Haram’s
violent extremism has been a military crackdown that has raised
concerns of rights violations141 and effectiveness in the long-term.142
Military and law enforcement response as a way of combating
violent extremism have been an easy choice for many countries
facing such problems. 143 Governments often resort to labelling
insurgents as terrorists in order to delegitimize them and open a
way to apply the “hard tactics” for countering them. Nigeria has
justified its military approach to counter-insurgency by linking Boko

nigerian-military-to-continue-sambisa-forest-operation-after-killing-over-20-bokoharam-suspects-in-raid.html [https://perma.cc/88H4-MKVC] (noting the success
of a Nigerian military operation against Boko Haram); Akinola Olojo, Boko Haram
Exposes the Cracks in Nigeria’s Military Strategy, INST. FOR SEC. STUD. (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/boko-haram-exposes-the-cracks-in-nigerias-milita
ry-strategy (discussing how Boko Haram has caused the Nigerian military to reevaluate its tactics and intelligence).
139
Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, ‘The Only Good Jihadist is a Dead
Jihadist’: Boko Haram and De-Radicalization Around Lake Chad, 29 SMALL WARS &
INSURGENCIES 863, 874-77 (2018).
140 Id.
141 See Nigeria: Military Holding Children as Boko Haram Suspects, HUM. RTS.
WATCH
(Sept.
10,
2019,
5:00
AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/10/nigeria-military-holding-children-bok
o-haram-suspects [https://perma.cc/R7PJ-SHS4].
142
See Habibu Yaya Bappah, Nigeria’s Military Failure Against the Boko Haram
Insurgency, 25 AFRICAN SEC. REV. 146, 151-55 (2016).
143
See Mark D. Kielsgard & Tam Hey Juan Julian, Autocatalytic Models of
Counter-Terrorism in East and Southern Asia: An International Comparative Analysis of
China, Indonesia, and Thailand, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 461, 467-70 (2018).
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Haram with global jihadist movements like Al-Qaeda. Through this
linkage, Nigeria has attempted to globalize the problem rather than
deal with it as a matter of domestic politics.144
Nigeria is not entirely wrong to associate the Boko Haram
insurgency with global jihadism as shown from the on-again, offagain linkages it has exhibited, along with its splinter groups. Boko
Haram has increasingly grown to exhibit characteristics of global
jihadism and, significantly, it has the potential of sustaining global
jihad through its entrenched ideology, evolved tactics and potential
external links with other extremist groups. However, this potential
is overstated, and labelling has potentially served to further isolate
the group from mainstream government negotiations and polarized
the community in northern Nigeria. It has also provided no barrier
to Boko Haram to establish affiliations with other terrorist groups
with an Islamist agenda (rather the reverse), though to date the
linkages are rather haphazard 145 or haven’t meaningfully
materialized.
Nigeria’s first coordinated response to the insurgency in
northeast Nigeria was in July 2009 following a traffic altercation
between the sect members and traffic police over a failure to wear
motorcycle helmets.146 The escalation of violence between the group
members and police prompted the federal government to unleash a
brutal joint military and police crackdown through an operation
dubbed “Operation Flush” which led to the killing of almost 1000
sect members without due process.147 Thereafter, more troops were
deployed following a declaration of a state of emergency by
President Goodluck Jonathan in 2012, 2013, and 2014 in parts of
Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe.148

See Dowd & Raleigh, supra note 21, at 504.
See Zenn, supra note 126, at 7-12.
146
Hilary Matfess, Boko Haram: History and Context, OXFORD RESEARCH
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
AFRICAN
HISTORY
7
(Oct.
26,
2017),
https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.
0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-119?print=pdf [https://perma.cc/YRL5-PWYT].
147 Id.
148
See Onuoha, supra note 135, at 4-5.
144
145
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The military offensive had mixed results. The Nigerian
government managed to ultimately drive the group from the
majority of its territory and neutralized its ability to wage
conventional warfare.149 Nationally, Nigeria might have succeeded
in temporarily removing the problem from within its borders but
this pushed the group to attack from neighboring countries like
Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, which shows the lack of a sustainable
solution and, under one perspective, internationalizes the conflict.150
Additionally, this has led to a change of strategy for Boko Haram,
which has resorted to other soft targets through kidnapping, suicide
bombings, and sexual violence,151 instead of a conventional internal
armed conflict.
Despite the claimed successes of the military strategy by the
Nigerian government,152 a solitary strategy that avoided addressing
the underlying political issues that gave impetus to the rise of the
insurgency was doomed to failure in the long run. “Both military

149 See Nigerian Army Captures Last Boko Haram Camp in Former Stronghold,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
24,
2016,
8:36
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/24/nigerian-army-captures-las
t-boko-haram-camp-in-sambisa-forest [https://perma.cc/X6FG-JKZS].
150
See HUSSEIN SOLOMON, TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM IN AFRICA:
FIGHTING INSURGENCY FROM AL SHABAAB, ANSAR DINE AND BOKO HARAM 11 (Stuart
Croft ed., 2015).
151 See id. at 10 (arguing that groups facing military repression are more likely
to resort to more lethal tactics once they have lost military ground, using the
examples of Al-Shabaab’s mall attack in Nairobi despite suffering military setbacks
in Somalia at the hands of African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, and the
Islamic militants suicide bombings in Mali in September 2013 despite the military
successes of a French-led offensive); see also Emma Bauer & Meghan Conroy, Boko
Haram: Nigerian Military Crackdown Prompts Terror Group to Adapt, 14 TERRORISM
MONITOR,
Apr.
15,
2016,
at
1,
7,
https://jamestown.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Terrorism_Monitor_-_Volume_XIV__Issue_8_01.pdf?x
68464 [https://perma.cc/ZS6R-3F3Z (stating that Boko Haram has focused on
“wanton violence” against women and children rather than capturing land).
152
Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, has claimed that the military
strategy has been successful in driving out the militants from their base and
neutralized their ability to launch “conventional attacks.” Nigeria Boko Haram:
Militants ‘technically defeated’ – Buhari, BBC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618 [https://perma.cc/GN9RNBCR].
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and law enforcement are reactive models principally designed to
deter and react to terrorist acts as they occur but are seldom
concerned with rooting out and addressing the fundamental causes
of extremism . . . .”153 Indeed, concerns about the effectiveness of the
military strategy have been raised by experts on the ground who
have argued that the resurgence of Boko Haram attacks demonstrate
a need for a change of strategy.154
In addition to its lack of effectiveness, Nigeria’s military
approach to counterterrorism may be seen as falling short by
exacerbating the problem.155 Unfair and overly harsh military and
law enforcement strategies in counterterrorism are bound to be
counterproductive by alienating the affected communities and
leading to more radicalization.156 One of the key events that spurred
the growth of Boko Haram in its most lethal period from 2010
onwards was the violent repression of the sect in 2009 that
culminated in the extrajudicial killing of its leader Mohammed
Yusuf while in police custody. 157 Reported “massacres, extrajudicial killings and arrests without trial” in this repression have
created a rift between the security forces and the communities that
they are tasked to secure.158 As a result of the heavy handed military
response to the insurgency, there are reports of a rise in the
membership of the group from an estimated 4,000 members in 2009
to between 6,000 and 8,000 in 2014.159

153
Mark D. Kielsgard & Tam Hey Juan Julian, Stopping Terrorism at its Source:
Conceptual Flaws of the Deterrence-Based Counterterrorism Regime and Committing to a
Preemptive Causal Model, 26 J. L. & POL’Y 487, 504 (2018).
154
See Idris Uwaisu, Experts Say Nigeria Must Change its Strategy to Defeat Boko
Haram, DW NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/experts-say-nigeriamust-change-its-strategy-to-defeat-boko-haram/a-46803622
[https://perma.cc/DL6K-RQGQ].
155
See id.
156
See Kielsgard & Julian, supra note 153, at 487.
157
MARC-ANTOINE PÉROUSE DE MONTCLOS, NIGERIA’S INTERMINABLE
INSURGENCY? ADDRESSING THE BOKO HARAM CRISIS 11 (Sept. 2014),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/2014
0901BokoHaramPerousedeMontclos_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/PK5F-7848].
158 Id. at 4.
159 Id. at 15.
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b. Law Enforcement
Nigeria’s current counterterrorism law, the Terrorism
Prevention Act, was enacted in 2011 following the inaugural violent
episodes of Boko Haram in its second phase.160 This law, amended
in 2013, is aimed at providing measures for preventing, prohibiting,
and combating acts of terrorism, recruitment, terrorism financing as
well as incorporating provisions of the two international
conventions, the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism, and the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, into domestic law.161 The law provides stiff sentences
of up to life imprisonment if convicted for committing acts of
terrorism or terrorism financing.162
The use of the criminal justice system as a counterterrorism
mechanism has however been largely ineffective, with the Nigerian
government prosecuting only a handful of members of Boko Haram
for serious crimes under the Act. 163 A majority of those charged
were accused of professing membership in a terrorist group and
failing to disclose information that could have been material to
investigations.164 Many were set free, but only after remaining in
custody for long periods of time without trial. 165 The trials

160
See Uchechukwu Wilson Nwosu, Anti-terrorism Legislation and Human
Rights: An Appraisal of the Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011, 5 INT’L J. PEACE
& CONFLICT STUD. 77, 83 (2018).
161
Terrorism (Prevention) Act (2011), Explanatory Memorandum (Nigeria).
162
Terrorism (Prevention) Act (2011), Cap. (10), § 33 (Nigeria).
163
Nigeria: Flawed Trials of Boko Haram Suspects, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 17,
2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/17/nigeria-flawed-trialsboko-haram-suspects [https://perma.cc/D7S2-DFGU].
164
Nigeria Convicts 205 Boko Haram Suspects in Mass Trials, REUTERS (Feb. 20,
2018, 9:54 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/nigeriaconvicts-205-boko-haram-suspects-in-mass-trials-idUSKCN1G3253
[https://perma.cc/3E3L-9YM5].
165 See Agence France-Presse, Amnesty Calls on ICC to Fully Probe Boko Haram
Conflict
Atrocities,
(Dec.
10,
2018,
01:42
AM),
https://www.voanews.com/africa/amnesty-calls-icc-fully-probe-boko-haram-co
nflict-atrocities [https://perma.cc/S44J-82XQ].
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themselves have been described as flawed and not adhering to the
basic standards of fair trial and due process.166
Due to the intensity of the atrocities committed by Boko Haram,
the International Criminal Court (ICC) has considered whether it
has jurisdiction to prosecute. Following communications pursuant
to article 15 of the Rome Statute,167 the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)
made public the opening of a preliminary examination of the
situation in Nigeria on November 18, 2010.168 Even though the OTP
has found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
group has committed crimes against humanity, 169 the situation is
still under preliminary examination to assess whether possible cases
would be admissible.170
The opening of a preliminary examination by the ICC and the
possibility of opening investigations in the situation regarding Boko
Haram, however, raises questions about the ability of this
mechanism to deal decisively with the threat posed by an extremist
group that possesses all the characteristics and has the potential of

166 Nigeria: Flawed Trials of Boko Haram Suspects, supra note 163; see also Press
Briefing Notes on Azerbaijan, Egypt and Indonesia/ LGBT and Boko Haram Trials
in Nigeria from Rupert Colville, Rupert Colville, Spokesperson for the U.N. High
Comm’r
for
Hum.
Rts.
(Oct.
13,
2017),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2
2232&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/TLX2-273Y].
167
See OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIM. CT., SITUATION IN NIGERIA ARTICLE
5 REPORT ¶ 4 (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/docs/SAS%20%20NGA%20-%20Public%20version%20Article%205%20Report%20-%2005%20Au
gust%202013.PDF [https://perma.cc/YLY8-SUZT].
168 Id.
169 Id. at 6. But see Nabil M. Orina, A Critique of the International Legal Regime
Applicable to Terrorism, 2 STRATHMORE L. J. 21, 23 (2016) (arguing that sporadic acts
of terror may not amount to international crimes).
170
Admissibility of cases before the ICC depends on whether there are
domestic proceedings against those considered to bear responsibility for such
crimes and that the cases are of sufficient gravity. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 17, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 38544; see also OFF.
OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIM. CT., REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
ACTIVITIES 2018 (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/181205rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH7W-S85A] (detailing the case against
Boko Haram under the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011, the Nigerian Armed
Forces Act of 2004, and the Anti-Torture Act of 2017).
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transforming into a fully-fledged global jihadi movement.
However, as evidenced in 2009 when the group’s founding leader
Mohammed Yusuf was killed, an ICC investigation that would focus
on the group’s key leaders does not promise to serve as an effective
deterrent. In fact, if the current leader, Abubakar Shekau becomes
subject of such proceedings and is apprehended—which is a
challenge on its own—a different leader will emerge and take over,
perhaps Abu Musabo al-Burnawi, who heads a splinter faction, and
is likely to transform the remainder of Boko Haram into just another
affiliate of ISIS. 171 Research on Boko Haram’s organizational
structure 172 has indeed suggested an entity with a multi-layered
hierarchy headed by a Shura council and consisting of many cells.173
Further, the effectiveness of a criminal justice approach to
deterrence in the context of a radicalized group is doubtful in any
event,174 and more so in an international criminal court where the
focus is on a select few who are considered only the most culpable.
c. “Operation Safe Corridor”: De-Radicalization of Former Militants
Even as the army cracks down on the militants, it has, in
conjunction with other government agencies, initiated a deradicalization program for defectors that is aimed at reintegrating
them into society. 175 The program, dubbed “Operation Safe
Corridor,” aims to offer those who surrender basic vocational skills

171
Freedom C. Onuoha, Split in ISIS-Aligned Boko Haram Group, AL JAZEERA
CTR. FOR STUDS. (Oct. 27, 2016), https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/node/1490
[https://perma.cc/M57C-GVUN].
172
Akali Omeni, Boko Haram’s Increasingly Sophisticated Military Threat, 29
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 886, 895 (2018).
173
Nigeria: Examining Boko Haram, STRATFOR ANALYSIS (July 15, 2014),
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/nigeria-examining-boko-haram
[https://perma.cc/D7K2-JAMM].
174
See Kielsgard & Julian, supra note 153, at 513.
175 Nigeria Boko Haram Militants Offered Olive Branch by Army, BBC NEWS (Apr.
7,
2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35989401
[https://perma.cc/R97V-RZS8].
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that would help them to re-integrate into society.176 The initiative
has seen 151 former Boko Haram members taken through the
process and handed over to the Borno state government. 177
However, typically the most radicalized extremists are the least
likely to be receptive to deterrence.178
While the efforts to deradicalize and reintegrate the former
fighters may be key in addressing the economic and social aspects
of the root causes of the insurgency, this initiative still has to take
account of the plight of the victims, many of whom may find it
difficult to accept the former fighters back into society. 179 This
points to the need for greater emphasis aimed at transitional justice
to the victims and affected communities. The challenge with the
Nigerian approach is that by focusing primarily on de-radicalizing
returning fighters it seems to be ignoring preemptive efforts to
prevent radicalization before it reaches terrorist level proportions.
A holistic approach to de-radicalization would foster inter-religious
harmony within communities, greater economic and political
autonomy for Muslim groups in northern Nigeria, due process and
equitable access to the judiciary, and security forces that act and are
viewed as protectors of the community in strict adherence to
internationally recognized human rights. In short, the causal model
to counter-terrorism in northern Nigeria is predicated on political
and social solutions aimed at prevention. As the Boko Haram
movement has remained an organization with primarily a domestic
focus, the solutions can be found in domestic action.

Id.
Ineke Mules & Mohammad Al-Amin, Boko Haram: Nigeria Moves to
Deradicalize
Former
Fighters,
DW
NEWS
(Aug.
8,
2019),
https://www.dw.com/en/boko-haram-nigeria-moves-to-deradicalize-former-fig
hters/a-49950707 [https://perma.cc/D56B-6R8Q].
178
Kielsgard & Julian, supra note 153, at 514.
179
Mules & Al-Amin, supra note 177.
176
177
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d. Vigilantism
Through military efforts, militia groups have emerged in
support of the national security forces against Boko Haram, which
have been the main source of information and intelligence for the
military. 180 The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) has played a
prominent role in local mobilization of vigilante efforts at the
grassroots level.181 The CJTF has been instrumental in bridging the
divide between local communities and security forces especially in
the face of the brutality suffered by the communities through
Their local knowledge has been
collective punishment. 182
instrumental in assisting security forces with the collection of
intelligence and identification of suspected militants.183
With sweeping powers to arrest and interrogate, the vigilante
groups have been accused of perpetuating atrocities on those
suspected of being Boko Haram members with the acquiescence of,
and sometimes jointly with, the military and sometimes jointly.184
Further, even though the CJTF is organized at some levels with the
assistance of the military,185 the numbers have swollen to the extent
that they may become a security threat rather than a source of

180
See Chukwuma Al Okoli, War in Nigeria: Self-help Vigilante Groups are
Reshaping Security Against Boko Haram, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 4, 2017, 7:55 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/war-nigeria-self-help-vigilante-groups-are-reshapi
ng-security-against-boko-646314 [https://perma.cc/9S87-XP7X]; Daniel E.
Agbiboa, Eyes on the Street: Civilian Joint Task Force and the Surveillance of Boko Haram
in Northeastern Nigeria, 33 INTEL & NAT’L SEC. 1022, 1025 (2018),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2018.1475892
[https://perma.cc/UQS9-TBRX].
181 Id.
182
INT’L CRISIS GRP., DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD: VIGILANTES IN AFRICAN COUNTERINSURGENCIES
17 (Sept. 7, 2017) [hereinafter DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD],
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/251-double-edged-sword.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BX72-YALG].
183
Oluwaseun Bamidele, Civilian Joint Task Force’ (CJTF) – A Community
Security Option: A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to Counter-Terrorism, 7 J. FOR
DERADICALIZATION 124, 133 (2016).
184 DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD, supra note 182, at 19.
185 Id. at 17.
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security due to the possibility of misuse of their role to perpetuate
criminality like extortion and usurpation of law enforcement
powers. 186 Indeed, it is often the case that however successful
vigilantism is as a counter-insurgency mechanism, it is bound to be
counterproductive in the long run as it is not easy to demobilize and
often turns into an insurgency itself.187 Moreover, in this case, the
vigilante group would have been trained and armed by the same
government they may someday be fighting. Reliance on vigilantism
is a dangerous solution.
Joint security forces and civilian efforts against Boko Haram
have also meant that Boko Haram has stepped up retaliatory attacks
against civilians and communities who are perceived to be
collaborating with security forces, 188 mostly targeting community
leaders.189 It has been reported that 680 CJTF members were killed
between 2014 and 2017 in retaliation.190 This situation highlights the
shortcomings of the traditional approaches to counterinsurgency
and further widens the rift between those who support government
security efforts and those who are sympathetic to Boko Haram, often
providing the affected communities with an impossible choice.

186
See Vanda Felbab-Brown, Nigeria’s Troubling Counterinsurgency Strategy
Against
Boko
Haram,
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
(Mar.
30,
2018),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2018-03-30/nigerias-troublingcounterinsurgency-strategy-against-boko-haram
[https://perma.cc/8CXGU6M5]; see also Martin Patience, Nigerian Vigilantes Fight Boko Haram One Bullet at a
Time, BBC NEWS (Sept. 3, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa41097440 [https://perma.cc/GE65-BKSR].
187 DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD, supra note 182, at 26.
188 INT’L CRISIS GRP., WATCHMEN OF LAKE CHAD: VIGILANTE GROUPS FIGHTING
BOKO HARAM 13 (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/westafrica/nigeria/244-watchmen-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram
[https://perma.cc/3EKQ-V2CN].
189 Nigeria: Boko Haram Targeting Schools, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 7, 2012, 5:22
PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/07/nigeria-boko-haram-targetingschools [https://perma.cc/A9ZH-5HXF].
190 Boko Haram Kills 680 Civilian JTF Members in Three Years – Official, PREMIUM
TIMES
(July
10,
2017),
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/236363-boko-haram-kills680-civilian-jtf-members-three-years-official.html [https://perma.cc/L52H-RZJ5].
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V. PROSPECTS FOR NIGERIA’S COUNTERTERRORISM
a. Peace Negotiations
As a matter of principle, states and policy makers have been
reluctant to negotiate with terrorist groups because doing so would
legitimize terrorist activities and interests, which are often
considered irrational and baseless. 191 Negotiating with a violent
entity presents states with a normative challenge that places the state
in a position where it is seen as accepting that violence is a legitimate
way of advancing grievances.192 Whereas there is sound reasoning
behind the “no negotiation” policy, there are equally good reasons
for a state to engage with a violent entity with the prospect that the
engagement will lead to a ceasefire and create room for a peaceful
settlement—especially in a case where a military campaign has
substantially weakened the state and has grown out of an
insurgency movement. Toros identifies three such reasons:
First, negotiations may eliminate one of the reasons why the
insurgents may have engaged in violence in the first place
(lack of a legal outlet to voice their grievances). Second, they
may strengthen the faction in the insurgent group that is in
favour of nonviolent engagement. Third, they may draw
insurgent groups down a path of change or transformation
towards nonviolence.193
Applying the first point to the Boko Haram insurgency, by
negotiating with the group, the Nigerian government would be
acknowledging that the group could have a legitimate grievance
and hence giving it a non-violent platform to air the grievance.
Second, as shown in the analysis above, Boko Haram has had
different factions within its leadership with some that were

191
See Harmonie Toros, ‘We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists!’: Legitimacy and
Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts, 39 SEC. DIALOGUE 407, 408 (2008).
192
Id. at 412.
193 Id. at 413.
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amenable to non-violent political solutions and hence an offer to
negotiate may appeal to the moderate factions. 194 The third
argument is premised on the assumption that by appealing to those
who may hold moderate views within the insurgency, it might
create a path to a transformation of the group.195 Those within the
insurgency that would be willing to negotiate might push for change
of leadership to one that favors non-violence, an important
consideration in such a leader-centric group.
Aside from the complexities associated with the decision to
negotiate, from a policy perspective, there is the question of whether
such negotiations would be feasible in any case. There was
reluctance in the past to engage in negotiations as Boko Haram had
rejected previous attempts,196 and their demands have not been clear
cut. 197 It has also been contended that the Nigerian government
lacks enthusiasm to negotiate because Boko Haram doesn’t have
economic leverage that could have drawn the government to the
table as MEND did in the Niger Delta.198 Conversely, it is argued
that the group—in the first phase of its development under
Mohammed Yusuf—was amenable to negotiating with the

194
Conversely, extremist groups have been known to eliminate those who are
considered moderates and who would be willing to negotiate with authorities. For
instance, Mamman Nur, one of the senior Boko Haram leaders, was killed by
elements within the group for being considered moderate. See Ruth Maclean &
Ismail Alfa, Senior Boko Haram Reportedly Killed by Allies, GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/14/senior-boko-haram-figurereportedly-killed-by-allies [https://perma.cc/X24Y-QCPW]; see also Zenn, supra
note 63 (stating that Mamman Nur is said to have been in negotiations to end the
insurgency).
195
Toros, supra note 191, at 414.
196 See H.R. SUBCOMM. ON COUNTERTERRORISM & INTEL COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC., 112TH CONG., REP. ON BOKO HARAM: EMERGING THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND
22
(Comm. Print 2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT112HPRT71725/pdf/CPRT-112HPRT71725.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NG5-V8X7];
see also Ndahi Marama, ‘Shekau’ Denies Ceasefire Deal with FG in New Video,
VANGUARD (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/11/shekaudenies-ceasefire-deal-fg-new-video [https://perma.cc/9XXJ-ZVL2] (describing a
video of Shekau dismissing government claims about ceasefire talks and
threatening to kill the man who presented himself as Boko Haram's negotiator).
197
See WALKER, supra note 8, at 11.
198
PÉROUSE DE MONTCLOS, supra note 157, at 6.
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government, but the military repression of 2009 eliminated
moderate voices within the group and gave way to radicals who
assumed leadership thereafter. 199 Further, as opposed to other
groups like the insurgents in the Muslim Mindanao region who are
known to be fighting for independence and have been engaging
with the Philippines authorities for greater autonomy for the region
as a compromise to cease the insurgency,200 Boko Haram’s domestic
agenda to establish a pure Islamic State in the northern region may
not be feasible. Yet, the nature of negotiation as such is compromise,
which may have been possible with the prospect of greater selfdetermination with respect to local political, economic, and
educational issues. The strength of any extremist movement feeds
upon the bystander and sympathetic community members who take
no active role but provide emotional and actual support 201 to the
group. These members would be more open to compromise and
would assert pressure for peaceful solutions.
Indeed, recent negotiation attempts have encountered a few
problems,202 but have partly succeeded in the release of some of the
kidnapped girls.203 One practical problem with negotiation is Boko
Haram’s split into internal factions.204 The fragmentation is not the
result of conflicting agendas, which remain relatively consistent, but

Id. at 11.
The peace negotiations with the Philippines government have culminated
in the passing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law in January 2019 creating a path for
peace in the Mindanao region. See Mathew Bukit, In Mindanao, BARMM Is Only the
Beginning, DIPLOMAT (Mar. 12, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/inmindanao-barmm-is-only-the-beginning/[https://perma.cc/3NDQ-ZU2Z];
see
also Philippines Duterte: Martial Law Extended in Mindanao, BBC NEWS (July 22, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40690589
[https://perma.cc/GK8WRC7H].
201
See Kielsgard & Julian, supra note 153, at 502.
202
Michael Nwankpa, Dialoguing and Negotiating with Terrorists: Any Prospect
for Boko Haram?, 9 BEHAV. SCIS. TERRORISM & POL. AGGRESSION 106, 120 (2017).
203
Ruth Maclean & Isaac Abrak, Boko Haram Returns More than 100 Schoolgirls
(Mar.
21,
2018,
08:39
AM),
Kidnapped
Last
Month,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/boko-haram-returns-someof-the-girls-it-kidnapped-last-month [https://perma.cc/4EUB-5BV7].
204
See Wisdom O. Iyekekpolo, Boko Haram: Understanding the Context, 37
THIRD WORLD Q. 2211, 2221 (2016).
199
200
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rather differing views on targeting, tactics, and external links. The
addition of external links to negotiations means that pressure would
be applied by Al-Qaeda or ISIS depending on which faction of Boko
Haram the authorities are negotiating with. Under this perspective,
the feasibility of negotiation depends on the vitality and
commitment of the group to external links. The “Al-Qaeda effect”
portrayed by Boko Haram’s ideological leanings, tactics and targets,
and external linkages as expounded above reveal Boko Haram as a
“complexity.” 205 Given the existential position of both Al-Qaeda
and ISIS, Boko Haram would have to precipitate a break from both
groups in order to negotiate in earnest with the Nigerian
government or its designee. This may be unfeasible for splinter
groups that have broken from Boko Haram, such as ANSUR and
ISWAP,206 because they are more closely aligned and dependent on
external links to global jihadism. Indeed, the ties of Boko Haram to
international jihadism is better characterized as one of convenience
perpetrated mostly for mutual propagandizing purposes.207 Boko
Haram has suffered severe financial turmoil in recent years without
significant assistance from either Al-Qaeda or ISIS.208

205
Toros explains that the Al-Qaeda “complexity” portends challenges in
devising workable counterterrorism measures. Global jihadi movements like AlQaeda have categorically rejected negotiations and depending on the level of
affiliation, this could complicate any possibility of locally-oriented groups
negotiating. However, Toros argues that engaging with locally-oriented groups
would be a key to weakening global jihadism by emphasising the differences in the
agenda between such groups and global jihadist movements. See Toros, supra note
191, at 417-18.
206
Ruth Mclean & Eric Schmitt, ISIS Affiliate in Nigeria Releases a Video Showing
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
27,
2019),
11
Executions,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/27/world/africa/ISIS-executions-Nigeria.h
tml [https://perma.cc/G946-DP8E].
207
See Freedom Onuoha, Understanding Boko Haram’s Attacks on
Telecommunication Infrastructure in BOKO HARAM: ANATOMY OF A CRISIS 16, 27
(Ioannis Mantzikos ed., 2013).
208
See YAYA FANUSIE & ALEX ENTZ, CTR. ON SANCTIONS & ILLICIT FIN., BOKO
HARAM FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT 10 (2017) (providing an overview of Boko Haram’s
dire financial situation).
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It is also the case that Boko Haram’s current agenda is not readily
discernible,209 as it was under Yusuf. Originally begun to ban on
Western-style education,210 it then morphed into an adoption of a
Taliban-like social and political structure.211 As the movement has
become more dispersed, its leader exercises little control over its
splintered factions and the specific focus of the organization has
been lost.212 However, this is also the province of diplomacy with
an initial goal of hammering out a list of agenda items correlating to
the expectations of Boko Haram and the Nigerian government. In
hindsight, negotiations would have been considerably less complex
if initiated before Yusuf died. Thus far, negotiations that have been
carried out have been for the release of persons who have been
kidnapped. 213 These negotiations have, thus, been aimed at
achieving short-term goals and should not be seen as opening any
prospects for a pervasive settlement of the conflict, 214 but they
provide a precedent and possibly a channel for communication,
essential for the beginning of more substantive negotiations.
Without bona fide negotiation attempts and an agenda that would
form the basis of structured negotiations, the insurgents might step
up the kidnappings as a means of sustaining themselves through the
payment of ransom.215

COOK, supra note 11, at 22.
Michael A. Peters, ‘Western Education is Sinful’: Boko Haram and the
Abduction of Chibok Schoolgirls, 12 POL’Y FUTURES EDUC. 186, 186-90 (2014); Boyle,
supra note 59.
211
Onuoha, supra note 207, at 20-24.
212 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., CURBING VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA (II): THE BOKO HARAM
INSURGENCY
ii
(Apr.
3,
2014),
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1091608/1226_1396951718_216-curbing-viol
ence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MA2PFNCV].
213
See Nwankpa, supra note 202, at 120-21.
214
Babatunde F. Obamamoye, Navigating the Enigma of Negotiating with a
Jihadist Terrorist Group, 11 AFR. SEC. 397, 413 (2018).
215
See John Campbell, Nigerian Government Has Been Negotiating With Boko
Haram for “Some Time,” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerian-government-has-been-negotiating-boko-hara
m-some-time [https://perma.cc/78VZ-FY4H].
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b. Adopting a Causal Approach
Nigeria’s portrayal of Boko Haram as an Al-Qaeda affiliate
ignores its national context,216 which is key to understanding and
addressing the root causes of the insurgency. Labeling the
insurgency as global jihad is convenient for the military approach,
which has been employed so far with varying degrees of success.
Violent extremism has been associated with underlying societal
issues where it occurs. 217 These may be summarized as socioeconomic, political, and religious.218 The insurgency in North-East
Nigeria can be traced to a feeling of marginalization by the majority
Muslim northern part from the comparatively well to do majority
Christian south.219 The rise of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria is
thus attributed to its appeal to unemployed youth from poor
backgrounds who blame their situation on poor governance and
corruption.220 On a broader perspective, Nigeria has been plagued
by runaway corruption and high levels of inequality for many
years.221 Poverty and unemployment are therefore a big contributor

216
See PATRICK SMITH, NORWEGIAN PEACEBUILDING RES. CTR., DJIHADISME SANS
FRONTIERS? BOKO HARAM’S REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LINKS 1-3 (2014),
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/166705aa559ad5ab2cad
e4aa65139d92.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD6R-2UPF].
217
See Sam Heller, Commentary, Rightsizing the Transnational Jihadist Threat,
INT’L CRISIS GRP. (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/rightsizingtransnational-jihadist-threat [https://perma.cc/CNN8-RCGM].
218
See Adesoji O. Adelaja & Eva Penar, Public Opinion on the Root Causes of
Terrorism and Objectives of Terrorists: A Boko Haram Case Study, 12 PERSPS. ON
TERRORISM 35, 35 (2018).
219
See Caitriona Dowd & Adam Drury, Marginalisation, Insurgency and Civilian
Insecurity: Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army, 5 PEACEBUILDING 136, 142
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to radicalization in northern Nigeria. 222 By appealing to the
dominant religion in the north the insurgents have endeavored to
justify their insurgency through religious ideology as a way to
address what ails the region. A suitable counterterrorism approach
should therefore focus on addressing socio-economic and political
concerns in order to create an environment where peace talks can
succeed.
Scholars have proposed a causal approach to counterterrorism
which involves taking proactive steps to prevent communities from
being radicalized hence curbing terrorist recruitment rather being
reactionary. 223 These measures, they argue, should take an
international human rights and international humanitarian
approach, which would ensure that such communities attain both
civil and political rights and socio-economic development.224
VI. CONCLUSION
When classifying specific terrorist threats, the issues of ideology,
military operations/targets, and external relations are key to
understanding the nature of the threat, its international
pervasiveness, vitality, and assessing effective responses. Boko
Haram’s Salafist ideology does not in itself preclude non-violent
means to achieve their objectives, though many other groups
steeped in this ideology have resorted to violent means. Moreover,
because Boko Haram is leader-centric, a shift away from its current
leader in favor of a replacement in the image of Mohammed Yusuf

222
This is also evidenced by the fact that a number of former insurgents have
surrendered and given up the insurgency at the prospect of being offered skills and
an opportunity to get employment afterwards. A number of those who have
surrendered are said to be starving and had nowhere to turn to after the group lost
territory following a military crackdown. See Conor Gaffey, Boko Haram: 76 Starving
Members Surrender to Nigerian Military, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 3, 2016, 3:33AM),
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224 Id. at 527.
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could fuel non-violent negotiations and solutions. This is possible
because of the lack of strong linkages with other existential terrorist
groups like ISIS and because the source of Boko Haram’s grievances
lies in a strictly domestic agenda. Historically, the group sought
peaceful methods for advancing its goals and even during its second
violent phase it continued to largely target local entities as its
excursions into nearby Chad, Cameroon, and Niger were for
practical and non-ideological purposes. Thus, the efficacy of
negotiation with this group is significantly more likely to succeed
than with other groups with a more polarized international agenda.
The issue of applying a causal approach would require peaceful
and structured negotiations with Boko Haram directed at greater
autonomy in the north and increased local authority for political,
religious, and economic issues as well as locally-determined
education reform.
By applying a causal approach to its
counterterrorism model, Nigeria could stop the violence as Boko
Haram presents a feasible candidate for potentially non-violent
resolutions to the conflict in northern Nigeria.
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